Double jeopardy, public policy and a filing on the Seattle consent decree

Dismissal overturned because of suspension for same offense

Arbitrator Michael Paolucci sustained, in substantial part, a grievance filed on behalf of a Euclid, Ohio police officer. The City of Euclid, Ohio and Fraternal Order of Police Lodge 18.

The grievances involved three separate incidents, all arising from grievant's off duty conduct and included allegations of domestic violence, violation of a protective order  and theft or failure to pay for certain appliances grievant allegedly took from a house he was renting. Arbitrator Paolucci found that two of the three incidents was either unproven or termination too severe for the alleged offenses. On the third, the arbitrator found that grievant's plea of guilty to a charge of persistent disorderly conduct made serious discipline "fair." However, because the Chief had already suspended grievant for 15 days, the limit of the Chief's disciplinary authority, the subsequent action of the Mayor terminating grievant was barred by principles of double jeopardy. He observed:

If the Chief believed that discharge was appropriate, it was incumbent on him to not issue discipline and to make the recommendation to preserve the issue. He did not do that here. He issued a very specific discipline that was directly responsive to the alleged offense. He issued discipline that was the maximum permitted under his authority, and he did so even though he believed harsher discipline was justified. Despite this belief, he acted with finality. This was not discipline pending or conditioned on further investigation. It was the maximum allowed, it was in response to allegations, it was after a full and complete investigation, and it was with the full authority allowed. Based on all the foregoing, it must be found that the City's administrative method exposed the Grievant to double jeopardy. He was disciplined first for fifteen (15) days, and was then also discharged.

It is fair to recognize that employees are often “suspended pending discharge” or “suspended pending investigation.” That is not what occurred here. As noted, the discipline was formalized, imposed and completed; and only then was it referred to the Mayor for additional consideration. If the Chief thought discharge was appropriate, then a full and final discipline should not have been issued. Based on the record submitted here, the procedure was improper and violated just cause standards.

Arbitrator Paolucci upheld the fifteen day suspension originally imposed by the Chief.

Minnesota Supreme Court rejects public policy challenge to reinstatement of police officer

Reversing the Court of Appeals, the MN Supreme Court has found no public policy basis for vacating an arbitrator's award reinstating an officer who had been dismissed for allegedly failing to report his use of force. City of Richfield v. Law Enforcement Labor Services, Inc.   The Court held:

The City argues that the court of appeals correctly held that enforcing this arbitration award violates "public polic[ies] in favor of police officers demonstrating self-regulation by being transparent and properly reporting their use of force" and "against police officers using excessive force" and would interfere with the City's "legal obligation" to enforce conduct standards for its police officers. City of Richfield, 910 N.W.2d at 477. The Union argues that the court of appeals focused unduly on Kinsey's conduct rather than on enforcement of the arbitration award, and reinstatement of Kinsey does not violate any public policy. We agree with the Union.
Assuming without deciding that a public-policy exception permits courts to vacate arbitration awards, the facts here do not support applying the exception. It is difficult to conclude that the arbitration award violates public policy given the finding that excessive force was not used. Kinsey's failure to report does not provide a basis for applying the public-policy exception because the arbitrator found that, even though Kinsey should have reported the incident, the City's policy was not clear on that question. The factual findings of the arbitrator, findings that we give deference to, do not support overturning the arbitration award on the basis of a rarely used public-policy exception.

The Court further held that the award did not undermine the Department's authority to enforce its policies, noting that the Arbitrator did uphold discipline (short of termination) because of the officer's failure to  report the incident. 

The Court of Appeals decision is discussed here. 

Community Police Commission response to Seattle OSC

Last week's post addressed the response filed by the Department of Justice to a Judge's inquiry whether Seattle was in compliance with a  consent decree concerning police use of force. Department of Justice says Seattle not violating consent decree on police use of force - new burden of proof language no impediment to effective discipline. The City's Community Police Commission has now filed its own response. It challenges the analysis of DOJ and is critical of what it describes as the heightened standard of review by arbitrators set forth in the City's most recent cba with the police union. It requests the Court "to convey that the Consent Decree will not be resolved until the City establishes that the accountability system reforms have in fact been secured."

The CPC's position is summarized in an article Citizen panel accuses Seattle police of backtracking on reforms, violating federal agreement, and the submission to the Court is available here.

Department of Justice says Seattle not violating consent decree on police use of force - new burden of proof language no impediment to effective discipline

After an arbitrator overturned the termination of a Seattle police officer accused of punching a handcuffed suspect (award), the District Court judge overseeing a consent decree concerning police use of force issued an Order to Show Cause questioning whether the City was meeting its obligation to maintain effective compliance with the terms of the decree. Specifically, the Court requested a response on several questions, including:

Whether the events surrounding the [Disciplinary Review Board's] decision to reinstate an SPD officer who punched a hand-cuffed subject who was sitting in a patrol car, and the new CBA's rejection of aspects of the Accountability Ordinance—including those aspects that would have replaced the DRB with the PSCSC and provided for a different standard of review—should lead the court to conclude that the City and the SPD have failed to maintain full and effective compliance with the Consent Decree during Phase II?

The US Department of Justice has responded, (here) expressing its position that the particulars of an individual case, which took place prior to the time designated to evaluate compliance, could not demonstrate the City's noncompliance.  It noted that the City had taken action against the officer, and that "one incident is not necessarily reflective of a system-wide problem" and that the Department's rules and systems designed to catch and correct individual issues appeared to be working as intended.

It also noted that while it had initially expressed concern about the standard of review for disciplinary actions included in the most recent cba, after further review it found no basis to challenge it.

 The DOJ noted that prior to 2008 the applicable cba provided that discipline would be imposed only with just cause, but did not specify any burden of proof to be used.

In 2008, a new cba added language creating a presumption of termination for officers found to have engaged in dishonesty, but also provided that the Department must prove dishonesty "by clear and convincing evidence."

In preparation for a new cba in 2018, the City submitted proposed language to the Court, and the Court asked for the DOJ's opinion. The DOJ asserted that the addition of a "clear and convincing" burden "without any clear basis" could potentially undermine public confidence. It later noted, however, that this suggestion was in error, since "the use of the clear and convincing standard (1) was not new; and (2) had a clear basis for inclusion." In any case, however, the final 2018 cba language on discipline eliminated specific reference to a particular standard. The new language read:

The standard of review and burden of proof in  labor arbitration will be consistent with established principles of labor arbitration. For example, and without limitation on other examples or applications, the parties agree that these principles include an elevated standard of review (i.e. - more than a preponderance of the evidence) for termination cases where the alleged offense is stigmatizing to a law enforcement officer, making it difficult for the employee to get other law enforcement employment.

After reviewing prior arbitration awards furnished by the City (Exhibits B,C,D,E,F, and G) DOJ found that this heightened standard had been in effect for some time as part of the "common law of arbitration" and concluded that the new language would not make disciplining officers more difficult than in the past and presented no conflict with the consent decree.

Should pension payments be offset against a back pay award?

That is the question raised in a recent Petition filed by Public Service Company of New Mexico seeking to overturn an award of Arbitrator John Fletcher.

Grievant had been terminated for an alleged safety violation which resulted in his injury. Arbitrator Fletcher sustained the grievance and reversed the termination. As to remedy, he ordered the Company to reinstate grievant and compensate him for wages and benefits lost. The award further provides

The only offsets the Company may take from the back pay due [grievant] is earnings he made working within the state of New Mexico, as evidence in this record is uncontroverted  and conclusive that he was unable to work in his trade in that state because he had been fired by the Company.

 The Arbitrator also awarded interest on the back pay, at the prevailing IRS rate, to be compounded quarterly. He retained jurisdiction for six months to deal with issues arising from the remedy awarded.

While acknowledging that a hearing before the Arbitrator on remedy questions is scheduled for later this month, the Company filed its Petition to avoid any statute of limitations issue, and reserved its right to amend its Petition based upon the Arbitrator's ruling on the remedy issues.

The Company does not challenge the Arbitrator's decision on the just cause issue, but asserts that the remedy is contrary to the cba, and constitutes an improper penalty. It challenges the restriction on offsets for back pay earned outside the state of New Mexico (which it states is in excess of $250,000.) and the award of any interest "at more than the applicable IRS annual interest rate which varied between 3-5% during the backpay period."

With regard to the pension question, the Petition alleges:

[The Company] paid $145,867.32 in pension benefits to [grievant] after he retired effective December 1, 2010. [Grievant] would not and could not have received such pension benefits in addition to wages from [the Company], [grievant] did not contribute to the pension plan, [grievant] is not required to re-pay the pension benefits he has received, and when [grievant] retires, the payment of the pension benefits will resume at the same level.

The Company maintains, therefore, that the pension payment should be allowed as an offset.

Update: The complaint was dismissed on the Union's unopposed motion.