Three recent cases reach different
results in actions to set aside arbitration awards.
In Wausaukee School District v. Wausaukee Education
Association a Court of Appeals in Wisconsin
reverses a lower court decision setting aside an arbitration award. The issue
before the arbitrator was whether the School District violated the cba by
partially laying off one teacher. The arbitrator upheld the union’s grievance,
finding that the layoff was not driven by financial considerations or specific
curriculum related reasons but was instead undertaken for improper reasons and
in bad faith. He awarded the grievant back pay equivalent to the job reduction.
The School District sought to vacate the award, and the lower court granted
that request. It concluded that the arbitrator did not find a violation of the
layoff article, that the question of whether it was necessary to lay off
teachers was beyond the arbitrator’s authority, and that the decision to layoff
was not a mandatory subject of bargaining. The Court of Appeals reversed,
finding that the arbitrator, in effect, found a violation of the layoff article
because he concluded the District “purported to lay off [Grievant] even though
there was no credible reason to believe that the District acted on budgetary
needs, curriculum needs, or any other reason…” necessary to decrease the number
of teachers. While the cba gave the District significant discretion to make layoffs,
the Court concluded that the arbitrator properly concluded that the District
could not use a layoff as a pretext for terminating a teacher when the evidence
failed to show that its actions were in fact based on budgetary reasons.
In Trenton Educational Secretaries Association v.
Trenton Board of Education a NJ
appellate court similarly reversed a lower court decision setting aside an
arbitrator’s award. The underlying grievance involved a claim that certain
employees were eligible for compensation for performing the duties of a higher
level position. The arbitrator upheld the grievance and the Board of Education
went to court seeking to vacate the award. The court granted the BOE’s request,
concluding that the award was based on clearly mistaken view of the facts and,
in any event, was contrary to public policy. Overturning the lower court, the
appellate court concluded: “There is no mistake of fact, much less one so gross
as to justify overturning the arbitration award.” The court also rejected the
lower courts public policy reasoning, finding it was based on “amorphous
considerations”, not a policy embodied in legislative enactments,
administrative regulations, or legal precedents. It concluded that the
award“does not contravene public policy; it merely honors the contractual
promise the Board made to its secretaries in …the Agreement”.
In contrast, in Horton Automatics v. Industrial Division of the
Communications Workers of Americathe
US District Court for the Southern District of Texas set aside an award
reinstating an employee found to have violated the employer’s safety rule. The
cba provided that “In determining whether the Company had cause to impose the
aggrieved disciplinary action, the Arbitrator shall be limited to deciding
whether a published rule or regulation which formed the basis for the
discipline was in fact reasonable and violated by the employee” The arbitrator
found the safety rule in issue was a reasonable one, and that the employee had
violated it. Nevertheless, he concluded that the dismissal was without just
cause because the employee had not terminated employees for violation of what
the arbitrator considered similarly serious (but different) safety violations.
Vacating the award, the District Court determined:
The
Arbitrator further second-guessed the relative importance of different
“serious” disciplinary violations. As a result, the Arbitrator substituted his
judgment for that of Horton, the company responsible for the safe operation of
the business for which [Grievant] had been employed. This, he was not empowered
to do….
***
As a
matter of law, the Arbitrator exceeded his powers … when he inquired into
matters other than the reasonableness of the safety rule and the fact that
[Grievant] had violated it.
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