Termination of police officer for off duty DWI upheld

Grievant was employed as a Sergeant on the Litchfield, MN police department. The department consisted of a Chief and eight licensed officers. In the early morning of October 27, 2016, grievant, while driving off duty, was stopped by a Sheriff's Deputy. The Deputy administered a preliminary blood test that registered grievant's blood alcohol content at .146. He questioned grievant concerning whether he had drinking. According to the Deputy, grievant initially denied having been drinking but later claimed to have had two, or maybe three, beers a couple of hours earlier. Grievant was arrested and charged with "driving while impaired" (DWI). A blood alcohol test approximately two hours later placed grievant's blood alcohol content at .186.

Following an investigation, grievant's employment was terminated for violation of several Department policies, including "criminal, dishonest, or disrespectful conduct, whether on or off duty that adversely affects the members relationship with the department,"failure to maintain a current drivers license {grievant's license had been administratively revoked following the incident], giving false or misleading statements [related to grievant's denial of having been drinking when questioned by the Deputy], and conduct unbecoming.

The termination was grieved and ultimately submitted to Arbitrator Carol Tidwell for decision.

Initially, Arbitrator Tidwell found that the policies in issue were reasonable ones. She noted:

The arbitrator finds that the policies, principles, and procedures cited above which the Employer asserts were violated by the Grievant are all eminently reasonable, including the provisions that relate to off duty conduct. Police officers are charged with enforcing the law and their violation of the law, especially when this occurs in a public setting as is the case with a DWI violation on a public road, is especially harmful to the reputation and ability of the police to maintain law and order among the general population. This is just as true when the behavior occurs off duty. It is accurate, as the City’s rules state, that an officer’s ability to do his or her job is dependent upon the respect and confidence the local population has in the police. It is highly reasonable for the City to consider the potential effect that an officer’s behavior at any time, on or off duty, has on the community’s opinion of the officer and by extension the local police department, and to promulgate rules that require exemplary behavior of its officers at all times. 

She also found that grievant had in fact violated the rules. While the criminal charges against grievant remained pending, she found that the Department had established that grievant "was indeed driving his vehicle on a public road having consumed a large quantity of alcoholic a state of impairment ...," and had given false information to the Deputy who stopped him. Similarly she found that grievant's loss of his driver's license and the subsequent conditional reinstatement subject to an ignition interlock device posed legitimate safety concerns and would engender a negative reaction in the community. Grievant's actions, concluded the Arbitrator, were egregious and the impact that conduct  in a small community particularly severe.

Arbitrator Tidwell also found that the City had established that grievant "lied repeatedly" to the arresting Deputy. While agreeing with the Union that the existence of a Brady/Giglio disclosure obligation does not automatically require an officer's termination, "it does not mean that a Brady/Giglio officer must be retained in the Department if the Department cannot accommodate that officer."

Turning to potential mitigating factors, the Arbitrator noted grievant's prior alcohol related issues and his apparent unwillingness to confront his problem with alcohol. The Arbitrator also remarked on the absence of any other officer of the Department testifying in his behalf. She did, however, reject Department's contention that grievant's plea of not guilty to the DWI charge, and his action in contesting the validity of the claimed consent to a blood test, evidenced a refusal on his part to "take responsibility" for his actions, concluding:

The arbitrator is convinced ... that employees such as the Grievant in this case should not be effectively forced to forego their Constitutional right to a trial and to contest evidence against themselves in a criminal proceeding in order to maintain or regain their employment.

Finally the Arbitrator considered and rejected potential remedies short of termination. Demotion, she concluded, would remove his leadership responsibilities but would not address the violation of the standards of conduct expected of him. Reinstatement on a last chance basis, or after completion of an alcohol abuse program would of necessity be based on grievance's recognition of the need for such treatment and a willingness to undertake it, something she concluded he was not ready to do. In light of this she noted:


It is well-settled in labor matters concerning discipline that the punishment must fit the crime. The arbitrator concludes that upholding the Grievant’s termination meets this standard; indeed she concludes that it is the only appropriate remedy in this case.

Arbitrator Tidwell's award can be found here.  A case also addressing whether an officer's denial of acts of misconduct provide a basis for a charge of dishonesty is discussed at Police officer's denial of misconduct insufficient to establish untruthfulness