Is there a "bright line" requiring the termination of a police officer found to have been untruthful in a police report?

That is the question the  Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court is considering in a case addressing an effort to vacate an arbitration award reinstating an  officer found by the arbitrator to have been "intentionally misleading ... but less than intentionally false" in his report.

 In an earlier case (Boston v. Boston Police Patrolmen's Ass'n.), the Court  addressed the "rare instances" in which an arbitrator's award must be vacated as contrary to public policy. In that case, the Court overturned as contrary to public policy an arbitrator's award reinstating a police officer found to have engaged in misconduct and to have demonstrated a lack of integrity:

The arbitrator, concluding that DiSciullo, while on duty, had engaged in “egregious” and “outrageous” “misconduct” toward two civilians and that his subsequent reports of the incident over a two-year period demonstrated that he was “lacking” in both “integrity and trust,” nevertheless determined that DiSciullo's actions warranted a one-year suspension without pay, rather than termination.   ...   We granted the city's application for further appellate review.   As we explain below, because DiSciullo's continued employment as a police officer would frustrate strong public policy against the kind of egregious dishonesty and abuse of official position in which he was proved to have engaged, we vacate the arbitrator's award.

In City of Pittsfield v. Local 447 International Brotherhood of Police Officers, the Court is being asked by the City to find that its prior decision creates a "bright line" test that requires the termination of any officer who  "lie[s] about a material matter in a police report."and to hold that an arbitration award ordering the reinstatement of such an officer is contrary to  public policy.

The award in issue is one decided by Arbitrator Michael Stutz, reinstating a Pittsfield police officer who had been dismissed for stating in a report that he had removed a prisoner from his vehicle “for her safety.” In fact, he had removed her from his vehicle after she had been arrested for shoplifting to allow the store security department to photograph her. Arbitrator Stutz found the report "intentionally misleading ... but less than intentionally false." He also noted that grievant had admitted during the Department's internal investigation and at the arbitration hearing that he had removed the prisoner from his vehicle to allow her picture to be taken, not for her safety, and acknowledged that he should not have done so.  He concluded:

... I find that the seriousness of the grievant's admitted inaccuracy was not so dishonest that it was a capital offense, and, therefore, there was no just cause to terminate for three misleading words in his arrest report.
Nonetheless, the misleading report was a serious offense that calls for progressive discipline. The grievant received a three-day suspension in 2011 and, more recently, warnings. Therefore I will return him to the three-day suspension level of progressive discipline. 

The City sought vacate the award as contrary to public policy. The Superior Court declined to vacate the award. (here). It noted initially that:

...the distinction between "untrue and intentionally misleading" and "intentionally false" escapes me. It seems to me, that if a statement is untrue and intentionally misleading, it is by definition intentionally false.

Nevertheless, the Court refused to vacate, observing:

The City argues that public policy not only permits but requires Eason's termination. It
claims that any lie, be it big or small, absolutely disqualifies a police officer from continuing to
serve in his position, and that any act of dishonesty, no matter the circumstances, requires
dismissal. However, such a "bright line" rule has evidently not been consistently applied by the
City, because, as the arbitrator pointed out, the drug task force member who illegally possessed
steroids received only a five-day suspension and is still a member of the department. There
appears to be some force to the Union's argument that this disparity violates "the principle of
uniformity and equitable treatment of similarly situated individuals." Falmouth v. Civil Service
Commission, 44 7 Mass. 814, 824 (2006). Beyond that, if an officer reported for work fifteen
minutes late and told his supervisor that he was late because his child was ill, and if it was later
discovered that he was late because he overslept, the Court would be hard pressed to conclude
that public policy required that he be discharged from his employment. Even (and perhaps
especially) in matters of public policy, there is room for nuance, judgment and discretion. I am
not convinced by the City's argument that termination is required in all cases of dishonesty,
without exception. Given the other facts found by the arbitrator (i.e., that Wynn's decision to
recommend termination may have been influenced by the 2015 incident in which Eason was
exonerated, that other officers received less severe punishment for similar misconduct, etc.), "it
was within the arbitrator's ample authority to conclude that these factors made progressive
discipline rather than termination an appropriate remedy." City of Springfield v. United Public Service Employees Union, 89 Mass. App. Ct. at 260.

On a direct appeal to the Supreme Judicial Court the City has renewed its argument. The Union argues against the application of any "bright line" rule compelling termination in all case involving dishonesty. Relying in part on two out of state decisions addressing similar issues, Kitsap Deputy Sheriff's Guild v . Kitsap Co., 219 P.3d 675 (Wash., 2009), and  State v. Pub. Safety Emp. Ass'n, 257 P.3d 151 (Alaska, 2011), the Union argues:

... there is no well defined, dominant public policy that requires the termination of every police officer who has made a misstatement without regard to the context, consequence, purpose, impact on the public or the department, or the severity of that misstatement . A bright line test holding that any misstatement requires termination of a police officer serves no purpose and unnecessarily deprives an arbitrator of the power to do what the parties have agreed an arbitrator should do: determine the facts and then determine what if any discipline is appropriate .

The briefs of the parties, and the amicus brief of the Massachusetts Police Chiefs Association, can be found on the Court's docket here. A video of the oral argument is available here (City of Pittsfield v. Local 447 International Brotherhood of Police Officers SJC-12450 Argue Date: Monday May 7, 2018)

  Update: The SJC has affirmed, refusing to find the award violates public policy  CITY OF PITTSFIELD vs. LOCAL 447 INTERNATIONAL BROTHERHOOD OF POLICE OFFICERS  The Courts opinion is discussed in Police dishonesty, public policy and reinstatement - Mass SJC upholds arbitrator's award reinstating police officer who filed ""intentionally misleading" report